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Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In con-
trast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. Moreover, miners are rewarded for blocks that
eventually become part of the longest chain. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence
to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However,
these equilibria are not subgame perfect.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the
literature, we assume a finite time horizon. Moreover, miners are rewarded for blocks that eventually
become part of the longest chain. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to
conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However,
these equilibria are not subgame perfect.
© 2020 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Since the introduction of the bitcoin consensus protocol by
Nakamoto (2009), blockchains have fascinated scholars from a
variety of disciplines. The game-theoretic analysis of dynamic
consensus protocols has, consequently, gained substantial mo-
mentum over the last decade. In an important recent contribu-
tion, Biais et al. (2019) proposed modeling the construction of a
blockchain as a stochastic game in continuous time with infinite
horizon and possibly incomplete information. Their sophisticated
framework allows a wealth of interesting conclusions. Here, we
will try a related, but more elementary analysis.
Specifically, in this paper, we model the construction of a
blockchain as an extensive-form game with finite time horizon T .
In each stage, the population of n miners (or mining pools) strives
to append the respective next block to the existing blockchain.
Thus, starting from the so-called genesis block, the blockchain
develops in a stochastic manner. Miners are assumed to earn one
‘‘token’’ for any block that is contained in the longest chain at the
end of the game.1 Now, being able to choose a parent block ad
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1 Should there be more than one longest chain at the end of the game, one
such chain is chosen randomly.
libitum, miners may intentionally try to create forks. A conserva-
tive miner always appends any new block to the original chain,
i.e., to the chain that contains the first child block of the genesis
block, thereof the first child block, and so on. We also consider
the class of mining strategies that follow the longest-chain rule,
i.e., that append any new block to one of the longest chains in
the blockchain. We confirm that conservative mining and, in fact,
any combination of strategies consistent with the longest-chain
rule, form Pareto efficient Nash equilibria. However, we also show
that, under the assumptions made below, these equilibria are not
subgame perfect (Selten, 1965). This contrasts with findings of
the recent literature that has found such strategies to be con-
sistent even with the more restrictive concept of Markov perfect
equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls
the formal definition of a blockchain. Section 3 introduces finite
blockchain games. We establish the Nash equilibrium property
of conservative mining and longest-chain mining in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses the lack of subgame perfection. Section 6
concludes.
2. Formal model of the blockchain
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 miners, collected in a set N =
{1, . . . , n}. We will use the following model of a blockchain (cf.
Biais et al., 2019).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109614
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Fig. 1. A blockchain.
Definition 1. A blockchain B consists of
(i) a sequence of blocks B = {b0, b1, . . . , bT }, where T ≥ 0;
(ii) a parent–child relation ⇚ on B;
(iii) an assignment map ι : B\{b0} → N .
Thus, a blockchain B consists of (T + 1) blocks, where T is the
time horizon. The block b0 is referred to as the genesis block.
Any two blocks may be related to each other by a parent–child
relationship. Finally, each block except the genesis block has a
miner assigned to it. An example of a blockchain is shown in
Fig. 1. The numbers close to the circles are the respective miner
assignments.
We will impose the following two additional requirements:
(a) each block except the genesis block b0 has precisely one
parent, i.e., for any t ′ > 0, there is precisely one t such that
bt ⇚ bt ′ ;
(b) the parent has a lower index than the child, i.e., bt ⇚ bt ′
implies t < t ′.
Popular mining strategies are based on the notion of a chain.
A chain of length K ≥ 1 in the blockchain B is a set C =
{b(0), . . . , b(K )} such that b(k−1) ⇚ b(k) for k = 1, . . . , K . The
original chain starts at b0 and, if there is more than one child to
a given parent, continues with the child with the lowest index.
E.g., in the example shown in Fig. 1, the original chain is Corg =
{b0, b1, b2, b4}. A longest chain is a chain in blockchain B for
which K is maximal. Clearly, any longest chain starts at b0. If a
longest chain is unique, it is referred to as the longest chain in B.
In the example shown in Fig. 1, there are two longest chains, viz.
C1 = {b0, b1, b3, b6, b7} and C2 = {b0, b1, b2, b5, b8}.
3. Finite blockchain games
Suppose the n miners incrementally construct a blockchain B
by interacting over T ≥ 1 stages. We denote the intermediate
blockchains as B0,B1, . . . ,BT . At the start of the game, B0 con-
sists only of the genesis block, so that B0 = {b0}, and both ⇚0 and
ι0 are empty. Next, at any intermediate stage t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }, Bt
is constructed from the existing blockchain Bt−1 as follows. Each
miner i ∈ N selects a block b̂t−1(i) ∈ Bt−1 from the existing set of
blocks Bt−1. Then, a fair random draw selects the winning miner
i∗t ∈ N of stage t .
2 The new block bt is assigned to i
∗
t . Moreover, it
is appended as a child to the block b̂t−1(i
∗
t ) chosen by the winning
miner. Fig. 2 illustrates the incremental build-up process of the
blockchain.
Miners’ payoffs are determined as follows. After stage T , one
of the longest chains C in the blockchain BT is drawn with equal
probability. Each miner i ∈ N receives one token for each block
b ∈ C\{b0} assigned to her. Miners are risk-neutral and maximize
the expected number of tokens they receive.
The stochastic game introduced above will be referred to as a
finite n-miner blockchain game. Note that, given the possibility
of forking and orphan blocks, the game is not constant-sum,
i.e., there are gains from coordination.
2 The random draw may be understood as a reduced form of the equilibrium
in a static model of mining competition such as Dimitri (2017).
4. Mining strategies
As the action space of the miners is expanding over time, there
is an abundance of pure strategies in the extensive form. Two
popular mining strategies, however, are easy to describe. We say
that miner i is conservative if she always chooses the last block
of the original chain. Further, we say that miner i follows the
longest-chain rule if she always chooses the last block of one
of the longest chains. Note that the longest-chain rule is a class
of strategies, rather than a single strategy.
We start by studying Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). The
following result says that conservative mining, and likewise fol-
lowing the longest-chain rule, constitute Nash equilibria in pure
strategies.
Proposition 1. Conservative mining constitutes a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. Similarly, any profile of strategies consistent with the
longest chain rule constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Proof (Conservative Mining). Suppose that all miners j ∈ N\{i} are
conservative. We have to show that miner i has no strict incentive
to deviate from conservative mining. Assume first that i adheres
to the candidate equilibrium strategy. Then, the blockchain de-
velops into a single chain consisting of (T + 1) blocks, and miner
i receives one token for each block she mined. Assume, instead,
that miner i deviates and works, at some stage t , on a block that
is not the last block of the original chain. Then, miner i creates
a fork when she wins that stage, i.e., with positive probability.
As a result, she does not necessarily receive one token for each
block that she mined. Thus, miner i potentially lowers, but never
raises her payoff. Therefore, a deviation from conservative mining
can never lead to a strictly higher expected payoff for miner
i. (Longest-chain mining) The proof is entirely analogous and,
hence, omitted. □
5. Lack of subgame perfection
In this section, it will be shown using two examples that the
considered Nash equilibria need not constitute a subgame-perfect
equilibrium (Selten, 1965). We begin with the conservative min-
ing equilibrium.
Example 1 (Conservative Mining). Consider a blockchain game
with n = 2 miners and T = 3 stages. Fig. 3 shows a possible
state of the blockchain B2, i.e., at the end of stage 2.
In this example, miner 1 deviated from the conservative min-
ing strategy at stage 2, mining on b0 rather than on b1. Thus, we
are in a subgame that cannot be reached if all miners followed
their candidate equilibrium strategy. Now, at the outset of stage
T = 3, the last block of the original chain is b1. However, it is
optimal here for miner 1 to work on b2 because this allows her,
with probability 1/2, to realize a token for the block b2.
Thus, conservative mining is not subgame-perfect. But neither
is the longest-chain rule, as the next example shows.
Example 2 (Longest-chain Rule). Consider a blockchain game with
n = 3 miners and horizon T = 6. Fig. 4 shows a state of
the blockchain B5, i.e., at the end of stage 5. The fork implies
that we are, again, off the equilibrium path. At the final stage
T = 6, miner i = 1 would work on b3, because this allows her to
win three tokens with probability 1/2 in the case that she wins
the last stage. In contrast, working on b5 and thereby following
the longest-chain rule would allow her to win one token with
probability one in the case that she wins the last stage, which is
strictly less in expectation. Thus, in the subgame, miner 1 has a
strict incentive to deviate from the longest-chain rule.
2
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Fig. 2. Blockchain construction.
Fig. 3. Conservative mining is not subgame-perfect.
Fig. 4. The longest-chain rule is not subgame-perfect.
It should be clear that these examples are not exceptional, but
represent a more general problem. In particular, it is not difficult
to construct, in both cases, similar examples with an arbitrarily
long (but not shorter) time horizon.
Usually, the lack of subgame perfection is associated with
the concept of a non-credible threat. This lack of credibility is
particularly evident in the case of conservative mining. Indeed,
there is intuitively little value in following the original chain once
a fork has developed into a much longer chain. As our analysis
has shown, the same lack of credibility is also present, but less
evident, in the case of the longest-chain rule.
6. Concluding remarks
Under the assumptions on timing and payoffs used by Biais
et al. (2019), conservative mining constitutes a subgame-perfect
(and even Markov perfect) equilibrium in which players follow
the longest-chain rule on the equilibrium path.3 Given that we
heralded our framework as a simplified version of Biais et al.
(2019), some discussion seems warranted.
One possible explanation lies in the different assumptions on
timing. Indeed, Biais et al. (2019) assumed an infinite horizon,
with individual miners being forced to exit at Poisson stopping
times. In contrast, our model assumes a finite horizon.4 A second
possible explanation lies in the different assumptions on payoffs.
Specifically, Biais et al. (2019) assumed that miners receive, for
each block they have solved, a reward equal to G(k), where k
denotes the number of miners active, at the miner’s exit time, on
the branch that contains the block. Importantly, Biais et al. (2019)
assumed G(0) = G(1) = 0. Thus, blocks in orphan branches,
on which no miner (or only one miner) is active, are worthless.
In contrast, we assume that miners receive rewards for blocks
mined on the longest chain at the end of the game. As shown
above, these differences in assumptions do have an impact on
the analysis of profitable deviations off the equilibrium path.
Unfortunately, however, the precise way in which this happens
is not easy to disentangle on a purely analytical basis.
On a more intuitive level, however, both models capture the
interplay between the miners’ coordination problem on the
one hand and the problem of vested interests on the other.
Moreover, while the assumptions used by Biais et al. (2019) give
more weight to the coordination problem, our assumptions give
more weight to the problem of vested interests. For instance, in
Example 2, the assumptions in Biais et al. (2019) would intuitively
allow miner 1 to give up her prior investments. In contrast, our
assumptions would let miner 1 try to realize a yield from her
earlier investments. As a result of this stronger emphasis of the
problem of vested interests, conservative mining is less likely to
3 For example, in our Example 2, all miners working on block b5 , respec-
tively, would be part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium under the assumptions
of Biais et al. (2019).
4 If the two models differed only in the length of the time horizon, this
would imply a discontinuity in the subgame-perfect equilibrium correspondence,
just as known from the theory of repeated games.
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satisfy the assumptions of subgame perfection off the equilibrium
path in our model than in Biais et al. (2019).5
Finally, we compare our findings to Eyal and Sirer’s (2018)
decision-theoretic analysis of a rational miner interacting with a
population of naïve miners. They pointed out that selfish min-
ing, i.e., withholding one or several blocks, may dominate naïve
longest-chain mining because it allows the rational miner to
bias the mining contest for later blocks in her favor. In our
model, there is no possibility for mining in secrecy, so that the
approaches differ in at least one important dimension. Notwith-
standing, selfish mining clearly seems related to the issues dis-
cussed in the present paper, and having a unifying framework
would obviously be quite valuable.
5 Indeed, the analysis naturally raises the question of how subgame-perfect
equilibria might look like in the class of finite blockchain games. As this question
has no straightforward solution, however, it will be left for future work.
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